Eastern Illinois University

The Keep
Masters Theses

Student Theses & Publications

2014

Public Wars, Private Warriors: An Analysis of
Private Military Contractors in American Foreign
and Domestic Policy
Phillip Andrew Roughton
Eastern Illinois University

This research is a product of the graduate program in Political Science at Eastern Illinois University. Find out
more about the program.

Recommended Citation
Roughton, Phillip Andrew, "Public Wars, Private Warriors: An Analysis of Private Military Contractors in American Foreign and
Domestic Policy" (2014). Masters Theses. 1364.
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/1364

This is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses
by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.

The Graduate

School~

EAsTERN lu.t~OIS l\m'FRSITY

Thesis Maintenance and Reproduction Certificate
FOR:

Graduate Candidates Completing Theses in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree
Graduate Faculty Advisors Directing the Theses

RE:

Preservation, Reproduction, and Distribution of Thesis Research

Preserving, reproducing, and distributing thesis research is an important part of Booth Library's
responsibility to provide access to scholarship. In order to further this goal, Booth Library makes all
graduate theses completed as part of a degree program at Eastern Illinois University available for personal
study, research, and other not-for-profit educational purposes. Under 17 U.S.C. § 108, the library may
reproduce and distribute a copy without infringing on copyright; however, professional courtesy dictates
that permission be requested from the author before doing so.
Your signatures affirm the following:
ii The graduate candidate is the author of this thesis.
L The graduate candidate retains the copyright and intellectual property rights associated with the
original research, creative activity, and intellectual or artistic content of the thesis.
L. The graduate candidate certifies her/his compliance with federal copyright law (Title 17 of the U.
S. Code) and her/his right to authorize reproduction and distribution of all copyrighted materials
included in this thesis.
The graduate candidate in consultation with the faculty advisor grants Booth Library the nonexclusive, perpetual right to make copies of the thesis freely and publicly available without
restriction, by means of any current or successive technology, including by not limited to
photocopying, microfilm, digitization, or internet.
The graduate candidate acknowledges that by depositing her/his thesis with Booth Library,
her/his work is available for viewing by the public and may be borrowed through the library's
circulation and interlibrary loan departments, or accessed electronically.
[::C The graduate candidate waives the confidentiality provisions of the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA) (20 U.S. C. § 1232g; 34 CFR Part 99) with respect to the contents of
the thesis and with respect to information concerning authorship of the thesis, including name and
status as a student at Eastern Illinois University.
I have conferred with my graduate faculty advisor. My signature below indicates that I have read and
agree with the above statements, and hereby give my permission to allow Booth Library to reproduce and
distribute my thesis. My adviser's signature indicates concurrence to reproduce and distribute the thesis.

Graduate Degree Program

Please submit in duplicate.

Public Wars, Private Warriors:
An Analysis of Private Military Contractors in American Foreign and Domestic Policy
(TITLE)

BY

Phillip Andrew Roughton

THESIS
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts in Political Science
IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

Fall 2014
YEAR

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE

Id -n -11-1
DATE

DATE

THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

DATE

THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

DATE

ABSTRACT: At the end of the Cold War, the global political arena was forever altered.
One of the major changes was the introduction of private military contractors as
legitimate actors of foreign policy. Despite this assertion made by scholars. private
military contractors are an under studied political actor. This paper traces the historical,
economic, and legal legacy of private military contractors in American history.

I dedicate this work to my mother and father.

2

Acknowledgments
I wish to acknowledge and thank the entirety of the political science department at
Eastern Illinois University. I would also like to send a very sincere "thank you" to my
thesis advisor, Dr. Melinda Mueller for her invaluable insight and quick response time,
for making this project possible, and above all for being a friend during the whole process.
Thanks are also due to Dr. Ryan Burge and Dr. Ryan Hendrickson for their contributions
to this research and for also being genuinely good people.

3

Table of Contents

Introduction

p.6
Methodology
p.8
Literature Review
p.10
Historical Analysis of PMCs

p.26
Economic Analysis of PMCs
p.47
Legal Analysis of PMCs

p.56
Conclusion
p.61
Sources Cited

p.66

4

List of Tables and Graphs
Table I: What makes PM Cs unique?
p. 12
Table 2: Examples of services provided by PM Cs

p. 14
Table 3: Results of Lexis-Nexis Search for PMC Search Terms in the New York Times
from 1984-2014
p.21
Graph 1: Department of Defense Bi-Annual Contract Spending, 2000-2010

p.53
Graph 2: Department of State Bi-Annual Contract Spending, 2000-2010

p.54

5

Chapter One: Introduction
At the end of the Cold War, the global political environment was significantly
impacted. The Soviet Union ceased to be, America was entrenched as the lone
superpower, and many scholars and pundits lauded the end of the threat of global, large
scale nuclear devastation and warfare. Additionally, many expected the US to utilize its
new status as superpower to ensure peace through international organizations and
multilateral political action (Hajjar 2013; Uesseler 2008, p.113-115). No longer would
citizens in Washington and Moscow concern themselves with the imminent threat of
obliteration, instead the Eastern Bloc was freed, and the hope of economic development
and political rehabilitation reigned supreme. However, the post-Cold War global political
and military landscape would present its own number of challenges, trends, and threats
that would test the new world order. Large scale warfare was a thing of the past in the
eyes of Washington, Moscow, and their respective (and in some cases, former) allies, and
many of these countries embraced demobilization and the reduction of their military
forces as a way of diverting funds to other investments that were urgently needed
following the demise of Soviet support (Avant 2005, p. 32; Heinecken 2014, 627-628;
Singer 2003, p. 55) Instead oflarge scale wars, the globe was soon gripped with a rash of
small wars and conflicts, often in places where the Cold War powers used to hold
significant influence (Heinecken 2014, p. 627-628; Singer 2003, p.9, 49-66). As a result
of this demobilization and reduction of armed forces, nations had to find an economical,
yet politically safe, way of asserting influence and control over these varied and localized
conflicts. It was this military niche that private military contractors (PMCs) filled, and the
one that led to their prevalence on the global stage.
6

Despite their relative infancy, PMCs have had a profound impact on the post-Cold
War world and the way in which countries fight modem wars. PMCs have served
alongside American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, protected numerous international
diplomats, and ultimately have had an immeasurable impact on how the post-Cold War
world looks. In a theoretical sense, the existence of PMCs calls into question central
tenets of how a liberal democracy is supposed to function in regards to the use of force,
and how force is provisioned by liberal democracies such as the United States.
Additionally, PMCs have played a consistent role in American foreign and domestic
policy throughout the history of the United States. Yet, PMCs are often overlooked in
political discussions and academic research .. Perhaps even more alarming is how little the
American public knows about PMCs. For example, no polling data exists on the issue and
very few mentions of PMCs in newspapers exist. To address this latter point, the focus of
this work will be to chart the role that PM Cs have played in American foreign and
domestic policy. While we understand that PMCs (and mercenaries) are historical figures
in global politics, what is less understood is the role that these actors have played in
American history, and how that role has changed. Much of the research on PMCs has
been focused on how PMCs behave across the world, including legal challenges and their
impact on military missions. However, I feel that these considerations do not provide a
complete picture of PMC behavior and their prevalence. The direction of this piece will
be to analyze the broadness of PMCs in American history, and thus further inform our
understanding of PMCs as a political actor.
In order to demonstrate the prevalence of PMCs, I will analyze a number of
factors. First, the rest of this current chapter will be to provide a baseline understanding
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of PMCs as a political actor. While the end of the Cold War brought about their rise, the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan increased their visibility to not only the American public,
but also to many policy makers in Washington, scholars, and pundits. A consideration of
their current status is a logically important starting point. This analysis will consider the
roles played by PMCs, their general scope, and other basic considerations of what PMCs
are and what they do. Following this baseline analysis, I will also investigate the number
of moral and normative arguments pertaining to PMCs in this chapter. Finally, this
section will conclude with the research direction and questions that will guide the
analysis that is at the heart of this manuscript, as well as a section on the salience of
PM Cs. Following this chapter, will be analyses of the historical, economic, and legal
legacies of PMCs in American foreign and domestic policy, before I conclude and
consider the findings.
Methodology
With the establishment of the research direction, I will now tum to the
methodology of this analysis. This manuscript will rely on an in-depth case study analysis
of privatization in the American military. In more specific terms, I will be considering
how privatization in the American military, as embodied by the use of PMCs, has
changed over time and impacted American foreign and domestic policy. I will not be
using comparisons to other countries or advanced statistical methods, but instead will rely
on considerations of a number of sources to establish a qualitative case. This case study
will rely on primary sources such as Department of Defense and Department of State
documents and findings, as well as a number of peer-reviewed secondary sources such as
journal articles and books. The introduction will rely heavily on secondary sources as the
8

introduction's role is to establish a baseline for understanding PMCs and privatization in
military. I believe a focused case study is valuable and appropriate for this analysis.
PM Cs have been a underserved area of study in academia, and an in-depth and focused
case study provides a framework for comparative analyses between policy areas and
nation states, while also establishing a baseline for understanding the number of factors
surrounding PMCs and how they operate.
The analysis related to the case study will be three pronged in its approach. First,
the historical consideration will rely heavily on secondary sources in the realm of military
history and political science. The historical chapter will consider the role played by
private actors in American military history, how the roles have changed, and the impact
of these private actors on the war making apparatus. The second chapter of analysis is
economic in its focus. The economic chapter will utilize secondary sources in its first
section to establish a number of economic arguments related to PMCs, before
transitioning to a second section in which primary data from government sources will be
used to demonstrate a financial legacy of PMCs. The final analysis chapter will be on the
legal legacy of PMCs and will rely on court rulings and Congressional action to illustrate
its point, in addition to peer-reviewed academic journals.
Additionally, since this is a focused and in-depth case study a consideration of
validity is needed. In regards to internal validity, I believe that findings and implications
that would result from the three analysis chapters would be demonstrative of internal
validity. I also believe that internal validity is supported by the number, variety, and
quality of the sources utilized in the analysis. However the issue of external validity
remains. Based on the literature, there are possibilities for external validity, particularly
9
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in countries similar to the United States in terms of military investment, political pressure,
and ideology. I will address the presence of internal and external validity throughout the
manuscript where necessary.
"Long Live War, Long Live Death, Long Live the Cursed Mercenary"
The mercenary has often been a romanticized character throughout history. You
can look to many real and fictional entities as testament to this. Han Solo from Star Wars
was a smuggler and mercenary, as well as the "greatest bounty hunter in the galaxy"
Boba Fett. Additionally, Rambo has worked with seemingly reliable and morally
righteous mercenaries to save people from terrorists, and Denzel Washington and
Leonardo DiCaprio have portrayed" respectable" mercenaries in Man on Fire and Blood
Diamond respectively. These are specific examples of the fictionalized character of the

mercenary that leads a life of intrigue, mystery, and danger, similar to the historical
American obsession with gangsters, pirates, and cowboys. Yet, we must acknowledge
that mercenaries are not simply actors of fiction, but are living, breathing humans that can
profoundly impact how foreign and domestic policy is enacted. History has many
testimonies to the impact of mercenaries whether it be the utilization of mercenaries by
the Romans to protect their shores in the First Punic War, the British use of Hessians in
the Revolutionary War, or the countless mercenary groups that have done their part in
African civil wars (Lanning 2005).
Yet, is it fair to label PMCs as mercenaries? That answer requires consideration of
the definition of the word mercenary, as well as the goal and actions of PMCs. According
to the Merriam Webster dictionary, the definition of a mercenary is: "A soldier who is
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paid by a foreign country to fight in its army: a soldier who will fight for any country or
group that hires him"
Interestingly enough, most of America's modem PMCs meet this definition, while
also completely working around it and exhibiting unique characteristics. For example,
while PMCs are certainly paid for their work, it is inaccurate to claim that they are being
paid by a foreign country, or that they would fight for any entity that would pay them due
to the fact that many of America's PMCs consist of American citizens who have either
worked in police work or in the armed forces, and therefore exhibit some semblance of
patriotism and commitment to an ideal (Franke and Boemcken 2011, p. 726 and 737;
Hajjar 2013, p.128). This loyalty is exhibited most obviously in the words of Erik Prince,
founder of the largest, and perhaps most infamous PMC, Blackwater. In his book on the
exploits of Blackwater, regarding Operation Enduring Freedom, Prince (2013, p.56)
writes:
"Blackwater's contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom wasn't ever
conceived as a business decision. We certainly received no money for it.
The team in Moyock wanted to help the United States strike back at the
men who attacked it, and opening our Rolodex and acting as facilitators
was one way we could do so"
Based on these examples, America's PMCs are not simply "new mercenaries,"
but are instead a new political actor that has some similarities to the mercenaries
of old. Singer (2003, p. 47) presents a more thorough and clear definition and
framework of the definitional basis of the modem American PMCs that are the
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focus of this manuscript. Singer (2003, p.45) argues that while PMCs and
mercenaries are both paid by nation-states to assist in military operations, PMCs
are inherently different because they undertake a "corporatization" of military
service. Going further, Table 1 highlights how Singer (2003, p. 47) presents a
number of other attributes of the modem PMC that makes them unique:
Table 1: What makes PMCs unique?
Organization

Prior Corporate Structure

Motives

Business, not individual, profit driven motives

Open

Legal and publicly traded entities
!

Market
Services

Variety of clientele and range of services

Recruitment

Public and specialized

Linkages

Ties to corporations and financial markets

Source: Singer 2003, p.47.
The historical and fictional mercenaries were often a loosely structured
gang of morally questionable men and women who would fight for any side. As
demonstrated here, PMCs differ from the old mercenaries in their values, motives,
structure, and also in a number of other ways. It is therefore unfair to label PMCs
as simply a new variety of mercenary; one must understand and study them as
what they are: a unique political actor.
The Multifaceted Actor
PMCs as they currently stand are a thriving, relevant, and long standing
force in global and domestic political life. Due to a number of related caveats,
PMCs have traditionally been a luxury for only the most advanced, prosperous,
12

and usually, Western countries. This trend is true due to a number of advantages
that include material wealth, military "know-how," and above all: a need for
security (Uesseler 2008, p.31 ). Other scholars have argued that a liberal political
culture is riper for PMC use than say "countries founded on the republican theory
of the social contract such as Germany" (Cusumano and Kinsey 2014, p. 3;
Krahmann 2010). As a result of these variables, PMCs have had the greatest
presence in Western countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom.
For example, several European countries contributing forces to the War in
Afghanistan used a PMC out of Ukraine for transportation (Singer 2005, p.122).
However, despite the Western bend that seems apparent, PMCs are truly a global
actor. For example, PMCs have fought on every continent of the world except for
Antarctica, and some major PMC groups call South Africa and Israel home
(Shearer 1998, p.71; Singer 2005, p.121-122). PMC forces are often made up of
persons from countless countries throughout the world including Nepal, Israel,
and parts of Africa and most of these persons are ex-military or police, often from
special operations groups such as the SAS (Singer 2003, p. 76; Uesseler 2008,
p.40).
As discussed earlier, some see PMCs as modem day mercenaries (justly or
not), yet PM Cs offer a plethora of services unique to themselves. Singer (2003,
p.73) argues that all PMCs offer services that have traditionally fallen "with the
domain of national militaries." However, this does not mean that all PMCs are
fighting alongside traditional armed forces; instead that capacity is just one of the
many services offered. For example, Percy (2006, p.11) asserts that PMCs
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provide four types of service: logistical support, operational or tactical support,
military advice and training, and policing and security. Examples of each type of
service can be found in Table 2 (Percy 2006, p.11-13; Terry 2010, p. 661;
Uesseler 2008, p.21-26):
Table 2: Examples of the services provided by PMCs
Logistical

The preparation and delivery of food and/or laundry to

Support

military bases/construction and maintenance of military
bases/refueling and storage capabilities/operation and
maintenance of telephone and radio bases/recreational
accommodations

Operational and

The planning and implementation of combat

Tactical Support

missions/gathering intelligence and data using

I
I
'

electronic and digital means, as well as traditional
means and the consolidation of this information for

i

I

military use
Military

Training domestic and foreign police and security

Training

forces in basic weapon usage, as well as more advanced

I
-

military skills such as piloting an aircraft or driving a
tank
Policing and

Protecting and escorting diplomats and other high

Security

ranking officials/ escorting of convoys/ protection of

~

i

!

vital institutions/ use as security forces in international
peacekeeping arrangements/ protection of third parties
in conflicts such as refugees and displaced persons
Sources: Percy 2006, p.11-13; Terry 2010, p.661;Uesseler 2008, p.21-26.
As a way of streamlining their services, PMCs often "package" their services
together in a manner similar to the packaging of home, TV, and internet together
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by cable companies. One example of this bundling of services can be found in the
advertising of the PMC Trojan Security Services. Trojan argues that it offers
"maritime security" to those entities that hire them, and this can entail security
consulting, counter-terrorism efforts, vessel escort and recovery, and a litany of
other related services (Uesseler 2008, p. 22). While PM Cs provide a number of
services that appear to support or advance the missions they are involved in, there
still exist a number of theoretical challenges to the act of privatizing military
services.
PMCs as Problem, and Problem Solver?
The theory of collective action is rooted in the work of Olson's ( 1965)
seminal piece The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups. In political science and related fields, collective action is often used to

examine how public goods are provisioned by any number of actors and the
impact of externalities. Olson ( 1965) argues that groups that participate in
collective action often have to contend with "free riders" attempting to benefit
from the good, without contributing to it. Due to the non-excludable nature of
public goods, this is almost impossible to stop. National defense is the epitome of
a collective good, yet the problem lies in the fact that it is incredibly difficult to
attain cooperation from the multitudes to engage in this public good, and also that
the associated cost is too high for individuals or small groups to solve it. PMCs
may be a solution to the collective action problem of national defense as the
decision making to use force would be driven by economic and market demands,
and less by the public sphere.
15

While the analysis has shown that PMCs are global actors that undertake a variety
of missions and tasks and can solve problems, several criticisms exist regarding PM Cs.
One concern that many scholars have is that utilizing PMCs directly violates or
challenges the historical monopoly that the state has had on the use of force in a
theoretical and practical sense (Chesterman and Lehnardt 2007; Heinecken 2014; Pattison
201 O; Percy 2006; Singer 2003; Uesseler 2008). This concern has multiple viewpoints
and approaches, and it would be useful and insightful to analyze the multitude of ways in
which this concern is viewed. In the broadest sense, scholars are concerned about PMC
interruption of this relationship between state and military forces because democratic
control over the use of force is an invaluable resource for self-governance and individual
autonomy (Pattison 2008, p.153) In nation-states, such as the US, where democracy is a
guiding tenet of civic life, it is important for Americans to have some say in when force is
used. Additionally, democratic control, it is argued, leads to more peaceful relations and
behavior when interacting with other democracies (Owen 1994, p. 97-125) As we have
seen, PMCs are primarily based in richer, more industrialized, and liberal Western
countries. It is therefore concerning that some theorists believe that the use of PM Cs
could impact the relationships between countries of this ilk.
According to Deborah Avant (2005, p. 5-6), PMCs can impact "control of force"
because, as mentioned earlier, PMC presence could impact who can control violence.
Continuing, Avant (2005, p. 5-6) asserts that "control" can be measured in three ways:
Functional, political, and social. Functional control measures the effectiveness of the
military itself, political control impacts those political actors that control force, and social
control relates to how force is used in concert with societal viewpoints such as social
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justice, democracy, and human rights (Avant 2005 p.5-6; Percy 2006, p. 15-16).Percy
(2006, p.16) also makes the argument that in addition to affecting how each of these
types of control function, PMCs can also impact how the three types work together.
However, many argue that just because PMCs could impact the control of force,
that does not mean that they have or will, nor does it mean that some private control is
inherently bad. Lindsay Cohn (2011, p.382) makes the argument that there is no reason to
expect the civil sphere to have less control over a PMC than over a traditional military
force as they both are under a contract, and seek to continue to receive contracts,
promotions, and accolades. Additionally, Cohn (2011, p.382) makes the case that the use
of PMCs could actually provide more control for the civil government when compared to
traditional armed forces. For example, utilizing PMCs could eliminate what is referred to
as the "bored soldier" dilemma, that is states are perpetually debating whether to keep a
large army, or demobilize, and possible impact domestic policies, and PMCs could
provide long-standing services such as air forces that are far too expensive and
specialized otherwise (Cohn 2011, p. 382). Overall though, both Cohn (2011) and Avant
(2005) believe that the granting PM Cs some control in regards to the use of force can be
helpful if utilized in the correct way and with the extensive regulations and a competent
state system.
Despite the arguments presented, many scholars are still skeptical of, if not hostile
towards, the way "control of force" will be affected by PMCs. Uesseler (2008, p.173)
argues "governments' duty to their citizens is to maintain security, which includes
democratic control over the use of force" and that this necessary balance "cannot be
reconciled" as long as PMCs are driven by profits instead of national interests.
17

Additionally, Ken Silverstein (2000, p.143) believes that the state embrace of PMCs is
dangerous and that PMCs are the ''footsoldiers of privatization, by which the
responsibilities of government are transferred to corporate hands." Silverstein (2000, p.
xvii) also contends that the US should abandon the use of PMCs in order to "construct a
defense policy based on real issues and threats" and not one that is driven by profit
margins and "small groups of hardliners." Another scholar skeptical of the loss of control
is Lindy Heinecken. In her piece "Outsourcing Public Security: The Unforeseen
Consequences for the Military Profession", Heinecken (2014, p.630) argues that the use
of PM Cs means that ''the armed forces no longer held the exclusive monopoly over the
management and application of violence." Additionally, Heinecken (2014, p. 631-638)
believes that the introduction of private fighters may have some benefits, but their impact
on military autonomy, skills, sense of "corporateness," and service ethic makes her
especially critical and skeptical of their wide use and application.
Pattison, a political theorist, finds contention with some aforementioned scholars
such as Avant and Cohn, in that Pattison believes that the privatization of force is
fundamentally and inherently unethical and \\-Tong, and that no level of regulation can
reverse this (Pattison 2010, p. 427). Much of Pattison's argument centers around
questions and concerns that he has about the motives, and not so much the intentions, of
those people whom make up PMCs. Motives, as Pattison argues, consist of underlying
reasons for doing something, while intentions are objectives or purposes (Pattison 2010, p.
433). While a private contractor may have noble intentions such as protecting innocents
or protecting important politicians and diplomats, the motivation behind these intentions
are inherently immoral because they are based entirely on the idea of making money. As
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Pattison (2010, p.433-434) writes "the issue of motives ... presents a potentially deeper
objection" for three reasons:
1. Motives matter in moral judgment.
2. It is problematic if individuals are motivated by financial gain in the context
of military force, given that military force harms others.
3. Private contractors are more likely to be motivated by financial gain than
regular soldiers
Pattison makes the argument that because of the presence of these three variables, and the
fact that they are uncontroversial and generally agreed to, American policy makers
should be strongly dissuaded from using PMCs as they provide no benefits, yet come
with some significant moral challenges (Pattison 2010, p. 435). Unlike traditional armed
forces who are motivated by duty, sense of self, and commitment to national ideals or
missions, the self-interested motives of PMCs present significant moral challenges for
American foreign policy makers and the way our country justifies military action.
Utilizing the theoretical framework of corporate social responsibility (CSR), some
scholars have found legitimate concerns regarding the responsible nature of PMCs. To
start, CSR calculates the responsibility of a firm in four areas: economic legal, ethical,
and philanthropic (Carroll 1979). Using this framework, many have not even attempted to
analyze PMCs as they are seen as ethically questionable at the outset and violate CSR by
their very nature. For example, E. F. Byrne (2007, p.210-217), argues that PMCs would
fail CSR tests because they harm the environment, violate human rights, cull profits
unethically, and abuse political power. Despite Byrne's insistence on the unethical nature
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of PM Cs, others believe that his complaints are questionable at best. In their piece
"Products That Kill and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Case of U.S. Defense
Firms," Halpern and Snider (2012) find that PMCs can exhibit traits of CSR and are not
inherently immoral. assuming they participate in philanthropy and contribute to national
interests in some capacity.
PMC Salience with the American Public

The purpose of this research is to chart the prevalence of PMCs in American
foreign and domestic policy, and one way to do that is to track the salience of the issue in
the eyes of the American public. A brief consideration of how prevalent PM Cs are to the
public, as understood through salience, will provide a comparative lens in which to
consider the findings in the forthcoming analysis chapters and is a integral part of
charting the depth of PMC presence in American history. The issue of salience is
important for a number of reasons. First, we understand that citizens base their opinions
of the president on how he/she acts regarding issues that are salient to the public
(Edwards et.al. 1995, p.121-122). Following from this understanding, one could reason
that how a president acts on non-salient issues has little impact on his electoral viability,
and that the president has wide latitude in dealing with low salient issues. However, the
way in which salience has been measured has fluctuated over time. Yet, for this
manuscript, we will be relying on Epstein and Segal's (2000) model for measuring
salience. While we understand that elite political actors are judged by the public on how
they deal with salient issues, Epstein and Segal (2000) provide a model for determining
how these elite actors determine issue salience, and therefore what issues to be concerned
with. Esptein and Segal (2000, p.72) argue that the most consistent and effective way of
20

measuring issue salience is to measure how often and prominently an issue is feature in
major media outlets, and for their case, specifically how often an issue is featured on the
front page of, or in a headline in, The New York Times. Utilizing this model, I will use
the Lexis-Nexis database and research tool to do a search of four terms: Private military
contractor, private security contractor, mercenary/mercenaries and Blackwater. The first
three terms present most commonly used acronyms and titles for the actor that is being
considered, and the final is the most notorious and infamous PMC group, as they were
the focus of Congressional investigations in the mid-2000s. I will be searching for
mentions of these terms in headlines only, and with no date restrictions. The results of
this analysis are presented in Table 3:
Table 3: Results of Lexis-Nexis Search for PMC Search Terms in the New York Times
from 1984-2014
Term Searched m Lexis-Nexis Database Number of matches
from The New York Times from 19842014
Private Military Contractor (PMC)

0

Private Security Contractor (PSC)

0

Mercenary (Mercenaries)

21

Blackwater

15

Source: Lexis-Nexis
As you can see from this brief snapshot of salience, PMCs are not covered frequently or
in great numbers by The New York Times. While PMC and PSC received zero matches in
the entirety of The New York Times publication history, Blackwater and mercenary
received some matches. It should be noted that almost all of the mentions of Blackwater
21

are from the mid-2000s, which is logical due to the Nisour Square Massacre and the
subsequent Congressional investigation, while the mercenary tag resulted in some
matches that dealt with issues other than PMCs. Overall, the salience measure presented
by Epstein and Segal (2000) indicates that PMCs are not a well known or salient issue to
the American public or policy elites.
To provide even more support to this consideration of salience, I consider polling
data related to the privatization of force and private military contractors. While mentions
in a large and notable newspaper presents one angle of understanding PMC salience, the
consideration of people being asked directly about PMCs provides perhaps a more
insightful understanding of the issue. If we can see, from polling data, that citizens are
concerned about, or have opinions of, PMCs, we can provide a greater contextual
understanding of their salience to the American public. I chart this by using three of the
largest and most often used polling data sources: American National Election Studies,
Gallup, and PollingReport.com. Additionally, I utilize the same search terms mentioned
above to provide continuity. Interestingly enough, a search of the same terms mentioned
above garnered zero results from ANES data, Gallup, and PollingReport.com. While no
data appears to present a challenge to the research design, I would argue the opposite. If
these prominent and well respected public opinion sources have not even attempted to
gauge where the public stands on the issue of the privatization of military force, what
does that say about its salience and importance to the American public? It is again clear
from this consideration that PMCs are not a well known issue to the American public, or
one that many political elites consider when developing policy.
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While we see that PMCs are not particularly salient to the American public, one
of the reasons for this may be related to what economists call the "casualty sensitivity"
effect. This effect argues that public support for wars is noticeably impacted by the
number and visibility of casualties (Larson and Savych 2005). This argument is
supported by Eichenberg (2005) as his work shows that the mere inclusion of the casualty
phrasing in questions greatly lowers support, and that public support is impacted by the
perception of casualties, particularly in post-Saddam Iraq. However, due to a number of
factors including incomplete data and legal hurdles, contractor deaths are rarely reported
or included in the death tolls of recent wars, despite the fact that contractor deaths have
ranged anywhere from 20-30% of all US deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan (Schooner and
Swan 2012). This leads to the public being unaware of these deaths, or in some cases not
sensitive to or interested in the number of contractor deaths, therefore affecting how
salient the issue truly is the public (Schooner and Swan 2012). As Jon D. Michaels (2010,
p754-755) writes:
"Private contractors are politically valuable insofar as they neither
enter into official head or body counts - nor, it appears, into our hearts.
That is to say, the nation identifies with its troops, to a far greater extent
than its contractors: "Americans are accustomed to hearing the military
death toll. But largely absent from the public consciousness are the
thousands of civilians putting their lives on the line as contractors in Iraq."
Combining US military personnel and contractors in combat zones thus
allows for contractors to lighten the troops' share of long tours, injuries,
and other emotional and physical hardships. But even more importantly,
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the aggregate loss of life is discounted by the fact that we neither hear as
much about nor, evidently, care as much about homesick or fallen
contractors."
Unfortunately, it appears that the low salience of PMCs is not without its cost.
While the American public does not know (or does not care) about PMCs, they
are still fighting and dying alongside traditional armed forces. Overall, the
consideration of salience provides an additional reason for the prevalence of
PMCs in American foreign and domestic policy.
Research Direction and Focus

So far the research has focused on addressing what PMCs are, what they
do, a number of challenges related to them, and what the public knows (or does
not know) about them. The rest of the research will be focused on establishing the
long standing prevalence and presence of PMCs as a political actor in American
foreign and domestic policy. As mentioned earlier, this analysis will manifest
itself in a variety of ways including both qualitative and quantitative methods, and
will cover the political and military, economic, and legal existence of PMCs as a
way of demonstrating their heavily entrenched and historic existence in the
American political lexicon. All of the research is attempting to answer two central
questions: what role have PMCs played in American history? And how has this
role changed over time?

The forthcoming chapters address these central

questions by narrowing their focus even further. In Chapter 2, the focus will be on
analyzing the role PMCs have played in American political and military history
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and how they have impacted our foreign and domestic policy goals. In Chapter 3
the main question will be: how prevalent are PMCs in an economic sense? And in
Chapter 4 the research will consider if there are any legal regulations or baselines
for PMCs, and analyze the legal standing and history of PMCs in American
foreign and domestic policy. In answering these questions and addressing these
concerns, a more clear and thorough understanding of the prevalence of PMCs in
American political life will present itself and this will help us to understand how
this aspect of the "provision of military force has maintained some of its basic
structure, while also radically changing, and the various roles PMCs have played
in American history.
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Chapter Two: Historical Analysis of PMCs
Mercenaries and Early America
Mercenaries are as old as war itself. While the Romans, Chinese, and
other long standing empires utilized mercenaries to varying degrees, the focus of
this analysis will be on the role played by mercenaries in American history. While
I make the case that PMCs (and actors like them) have had a long standing
involvement in American foreign and domestic policy, the first interaction
between American forces and mercenaries was not befitting of this relationship.
Breaking a longstanding peace, American colonists struck out against their British
rulers on April 19th, 1775 at Lexington and Concord. While King George and his
military advisers expected a quick routing of the peasant revolt, the American
colonists killed over 200 British forces at Lexington and Concord as well as 800
troops at Bunker Hill a few months later (Lanning 2005, p. 79-80). In response to
this slaughter, the British quickly employed the use of German mercenaries,
whom the American Colonists referred to as Hessians due to their area of origin,
to fight their war. This employment of mercenaries would play a significant role
in American independence as American Colonists viewed the war as a "internal,
family affair" and that the introduction of mercenaries was barbarous and
tyrannical (Lanning 2005, p.82) This feeling manifested itself as one of the
complaints registered by the colonists in The Declaration of Independence, as the
Founders wrote "He (King George) is at the moment transporting large armies of
foreign mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolations and tyranny."
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Despite the angered reaction to the British use of mercenaries, the early American
military also employed contractors and mercenaries to some extent.
Following a period of ineffectual logistical support, Congress centralized
logistical operations under Robert Morris, a Philadelphia merchant and
Superintendent of Finance (Kidwell 2005, p.10). Morris' new system of logistical
support to the Continental Army relied heavily on private individuals to deliver
goods and services, as large numbers of cooks, laborers, medics, and laundresses
accompanied the army on its journey (Kidwell 2005, p.10). This early logistical
body would lay the groundwork for the more nuanced and specialized model that
would be utilized in modem wars. In addition to the use of private entities and
laborers to support the war effort, the Continental Army employed mercenaries in
other ways. For example, Baron Van Steuben, a German mercenary was
instrumental in molding the Continental Army into a coherent fighting force
through his extensive military training at Valley Forge (Singer 2003, p. 33). As
illustrated here, the Continental Army not only battled mercenaries, but also
utilized them and other privatized forces to better improve their logistical and
military capabilities. The presence of mercenaries was prevalent in American
society from the start.
Following the triumph of the Continental Army and the establishment of a
new Republic, American lawmakers sought to build upon the work done by
Robert Morris in streamlining logistical support for military forces in an effort to
strengthen the struggling, and generally weak, American military. While The
Constitution granted the President control over the military, spending related to
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the military, including procurement and logistics rests with Congress. Initially, the
President sought and exercised control over the procurement of military support
resources, leading to waste and abuse in a number of instances. In response, in
1798 Congress passed legislation forcing contracts to be the subject of a
competitive bidding process with a number of regulations and caveats including
no advanced payments or Congressional profiteering from contracts (Kidwell
2005, p. 11). Congress also attempted to further simplify the process by placing
the process of bidding and purchasing under the auspices of military agencies
such as the Corps of Engineers, but scholars argue that this bevy oflegislative
activity did very little to simplify or streamline the process of contracting
(Kidwell 2005, p.10-12).
Overall, this inefficient system of contracting out for a number of essential
goods and services existed until the end of the 19th century. Starting with the
Mexican War of 1846, the US military began to professionalize and make
substantial strides in reforming and standardizing internal logistical operations, as
well as to establish safeguards to protect against fraud and waste from outside
contractors (Kidwell 2005, p. 12). Playing into this evolution was the nation's
improving infrastructure and new modes of transportation, as well as significant
investments from the War Department (Huston 1966). However, one alarming
trend of the mid-19th century contracting process was the cozy relationship
between some Union officers and contractors, one that often resulted in
sweetheart deals for both sides, while impacting quality and military preparedness
(Kidwell 2005, p.12) Despite an investigation by the House of Representatives,
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these practices continued for the duration of the Civil War, mostly due to the
difficulty of passing legislation in wartime. While the logistical situation
improved somewhat during the mid-19th century, a major problem still existed:
No decision had been made whether to create an internal logistical operation to
supply forces by any major political or military actor, and the 19th century US
army would continue to take competing paths on the issue, often resulting in
continued contractor waste and abuse, as well as impacted army efficiency
(Kidwell 2005, p.12).
At the dawn of the 20th century, most political and military leaders
acknowledged and understood that a professionalization of the US Armed Forces
was urgently needed. Following the Spanish-American War of 1898, and the
newly found understanding of the need to project force globally, the flaws in the
logistical system were obvious and numerous (Shrader 1999, p.5). To correct
these shortcomings and to better prepare for the challenges of the new century,
Congress enacted sweeping and important legislation to improve military
contracting and logistics. In 1912, Congress combined a number of smaller
departments into the Quartermaster Corps to improve efficiency and eliminate
waste (Huston 1966, p.294). This led to a centralized and consistent body of
enlisted men that were solely responsible for the logistical aspect of warfare, thus
ending some of the aforementioned abuses and flaws in the system that plagued
earlier military endeavors.
When America entered World War 1 in 1917, the US Expeditionary
Forces were supported by a private-public partnership not seen in American
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history at the time. This partnership was defined by the founding of the War
Industries Board, an entity populated with government and business leaders
whose sole purpose was to ensure that the whole the American industrial strength
was adequately and accurately utilized in the war effort (Kidwell 2005, p. 13).
Additionally, Congress ensured that abuses and waste were minimized, a practice
in stark contrast to the process that plagued 18th and 19th century military
campaigns, by banning advanced payments, closing loopholes, and through a
number of other contract protections (Kidwell 2005, p.13; Smith 1985, p.220).
Overall, the private-public cooperation of World War 1 was in sharp contrast to
the waste and abuse of earlier wars, and would be indicative of the future of the
relationship in the 20th century.

The Beginning of Modern PMCs
Up until the mid-20th century, the role of contractors in the American
military was strictly ad-hoc and localized. However, the changing nature of
warfare and growth in technology would alter their contributions significantly.
When World War 2 broke out in 1939, American political and military leaders
were happy to stay home, yet they also began to mobilize and enact policies to
ensure preparedness. Before 1941, the American government awarded contracts
to a number of domestic firms to provide logistical support and training to
American allies in the Middle East and North Africa as a part of the Lend-Lease
program (Kidwell 2005, p.13). Following American entry into the war, many of
these contracts were converted into military roles, yet the civilian impact on how
the war would be fought would be immense. Instead of being solely domestic
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entities that provided logistics and some training, contractors during World War 2
were often at as much risk as regular armed forces due to their presence in
military situations in North Africa, Europe, and other theaters of the Second
World War.
Technological innovations brought about vehicles and implements of war
that were often far too complicated to be repaired by regular soldiers. In response
to this reality, Allied forces required the construction of facilities in the field to
repair ordnance and vehicles. This task fell to private contractors, and more
specifically, the J.G White Engineering Corporation before eventually falling to
military actors when enlistment numbers increased (Shrader 1999, p. 6). For the
first time in American history, forces that were not solely military were
accompanying armed forces into hostile zones to achieve military goals. Historian
Lida Mayo writes that some leaders at the time saw "inherent dangers in assigning
to a civilian contractor tasks that were essentially military" (Kidwell 2005, p.13).
This viewpoint echoes the sentiments of some normative challenges presented
earlier, as well as the arguments put forth by scholars during the Iraq and
Afghanistan Wars. Overall, while military actors eventually took over the
responsibilities of contractors during World War 2, the mere presence of civilians
on the battlefield in military roles would prove the first indication of what was to
come.
The precedent established regarding private contractors during World War
2 would continue during the Korean War of 1950, albeit with some notable
differences. For starters, enlistment for US armed forces was significantly smaller
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than in World War 2, and this led to greater reliance on contractors to undertake
essential operations on the battlefield alongside military actors (Kidwell 2005, p.
15; Shrader 1999, p.7-8). However, many of these contractors were Korean and
Japanese, and this lessened the domestic human and economic cost, much to the
benefit of policy makers, a fact that would negatively impact future wars and the
way policy makers viewed contractors (Kidwell 2005, p.15). Overall, many
historians believe that without the commitment of these Korean, Japanese, and
American contractors, the mission would have suffered as traditional forces
would have had to undertake significant support roles (Huston 1966; Kidwell
2005; Shrader 1999) Overall, the Korean War was a continuation of the trend
established by the Second World War of having contractors in battlefields acting
in military roles. While the Korean War and Second World War showed the ever
inclusive role of contractors in warfare, a prevalence that was startling when
compared to earlier wars, private inclusion would continue to evolve and grow in
the American military operations of the Cold War.

PMCs in the Cold War
Early American wars featured contractors in supply and logistic roles
primarily, yet this role changed significantly during the Cold War. 1As touched
upon earlier, contractors can undertake a variety of roles and responsibilities. For
example, much of the work done by earlier contractors (particularly pre-World

1

It is also important to note before I continue that I do understand and accept that the Korean War
technically occurred during the period most historians refer to as the "Cold War," but the way contractors
behaved in the Korean War were more similar to the contractor behavior in World War 2 than in wars
that would follow it. I therefore made the decision to separate the wars based on contractor behavior
instead of chronological order
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War 2 contractors) was in the realm of logistical support. However, the nature of
the Cold War led to a greater reliance on contractors that acted in different ways.
One such case was the Pentagon's commitment to FFRDCs or federally funded
research and development centers. These FFRDCs served as analysts and "think
tanks" for much of the 1950s and especially during the 1960s and Robert
McNamara's tenure as Defense Secretary (Chambers II 1999, p.185). These
FFRDCs served an operational and tactical support role to US Armed Forces, The
Joint Chiefs, and the Defense Department, and were solely funded by annually
approved federal contracts (Chambers II 1999, p.185-186). These FFRDCs were
just one example of contracting during the Cold War however.
While FFRDCs introduced a new type of contractor to the Cold War, the
American effort in Vietnam still relied on contractors for significant logistical
support. Since the Vietnam War was relatively unpopular domestically, leading to
low enlistment and concerns over political viability, policy makers employed
large numbers of contractors for absolutely essential roles that were traditionally
military including construction, base operations, and transportation (Shrader 1999,
p.8). Due to this increased demand for logistical support, a number of companies
including Brown and Root, J .A. Jones, and KBR reorganized themselves in order
to take advantage of the opportunities presented by this new war (Kidwell 2005,
p.16). While World War 2 and the Korean War were responsible for the
contractor presence on the battlefield, the economic opportunities presented by
the Vietnam War and the related political environment led to another central tenet
of modern PMCs: corporate structure. Overall, due to the scope and duration of
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the war, the Vietnam War featured the largest contractor presence in American
history, a presence that was calculated at 52,000 contractors at the height of the
war in 1969 (Shrader 1999, p.8).
While we have seen that logistical support from contractors has been a
long standing staple of American foreign and domestic policy, the Cold War was
also the breeding ground for the type of contractor that would run rampant in the
post-Cold War global arena: the contractor that was involved in policing, security,
and the use of force. At the height of the Vietnam War, the US government was
responsible for funding and equipping Korean, Thai, and Filipino soldiers to fight
the Vietcong (Lanning 2005, p.143). While not exactly the domestic contractors
that are the focus of this paper, this example is still important as it is one of the
earliest instances of the American government hiring non-traditional armed forces
to use force. Similar to the employment of these Asian mercenaries, the Reagan
Administration utilized a number of former British Special Operations soldiers to
participate in military action against the Marxist government of Nicaragua
(Geragthy 2009, p. 142-147). Additionally, throughout the Cold War, the CIA and
National Security Council utilized private individuals and actors to achieve a
number of military objectives in Latin America, the Soviet Bloc, and the Middle
East (Geragthy 2009; Kidwell 2005; Silverstein 2000).
Overall, the role of the private contractor evolved more in the roughly 40
year span of the Cold War than in the 150 some years of American existence that
preceded it. Instead of a roughly assembled network of logistical support actors,
corporate structures began to form to efficiently provide support, while sucking
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up considerable government contracts. While logistics improved and changed
during the Cold War, the true last impact was the introduction of objective
support contractors that aided in analysis and targeting, as well as in actually
utilizing force to achieve military ends. The contractor that had always been
around had started to change in considerable ways, and the end of the Cold War
would alter private contractors and the roles they played in numerous and
significant ways.
The End of the Cold War and LOGCAP
As we have seen up to this point, private contractors have played a notable
role in American military and political history. However, while this relationship
has existed for a significant amount of time, it was not until the end of the Cold
War that the relationship changed significantly, and we saw the arrival of the
multifaceted and controversial actors that were established earlier on in this
research. As previously, mentioned there were a number of factors related to the
end of the Cold War that were instrumental in the development and rise of these
modem PMCs including the changing nature of warfare, domestic commitment to
privatization, and military demobilization, In the early 1990s, contractors played a
central role in the First Gulf War, a role very similar to the role played by
contractors in Vietnam, one of logistical support in terms of supply and
construction (Kidwell 2005, p.19;Shrader 1999, p.10) However, this seemingly
routine role would be a driving force behind a major development in the realm of
security contracting.
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After seeing the benefits of contractors in Vietnam and the First Gulf War,
civilian lawmakers issued the first contract under (the program was established
before the end of the Cold War) the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
(LOGCAP) with the expressed purpose of normalizing military relations with
security contractors and so that the US military "could fulfill missions without
always having to use military assets directly" (Kidwell 2005, p.19; Shrader 1999,
p.10). This arrangement was a significant jump forward for integration of
contractors into normal military routine. While historically contractors had served
a support role to traditional armed forces, the LOGCAP arrangement entrenched
this relationship even further, to the point where the military was often completely
reliant on contractors for a number of resources that would ensure military
success.
One considerable test of the new LOGCAP system was during Operation
Joint Endeavor, the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia in 1995. The main
LOGCAP contract recipient was Brown and Root (BRSC), an energy company
from Houston, Texas with ties to former Defense Secretary Richard Cheney
(Shrader 1999, p. 10). During Operation Joint Endeavor, BRSC established a
number of bases, provided food and water to military forces, removed trash, and
even provided some instances of police support at certain areas (Kidwell 2005,
Palmer 1999). Overall, the LOGCAP experience in Bosnia was a glowing success
in terms of the cooperation and efficiency of contractors in supporting military
forces. For example, observers cite the experience at Mount Zep as illustrative of
this success, as contractors arrived approximately 30 minutes after the military
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captured the hill, and established a formidable operating base on the mountain
within weeks (Palmer 1999). One scholar referred to the Bosnian experience as
exemplifying ''the successes the Army experienced with contractors as a force
multiplier" (Palmer 1999). In addition to the Bosnia case, the LOGCAP
framework would prove vital in a number of additional post-Cold War
engagements including Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Southwest Asia (Kidwell
2005).
Overall, the post-Cold War environment was the breeding ground the
modem PMCs that are the focus of this analysis. As mentioned earlier, the
changing nature of warfare and political restraints fostered much of the evolution
in the private military sphere. One scholar put it succinctly enough "During the
1990s, Westem governments increasingly shied away from sending national
troops into conflicts in the Third World" (Uesseler 2008, p. 117). Many of these
developing world conflicts were religious or ethnic in nature, and as a result, not
particularly popular domestically. For these reasons, contractors found willing
consumers of their products, and filled a need for American policy makers. In
addition to this (or in response to) this changing environment, LOGCAP
established a legal framework for the complete integration of contractors into the
American military machine. Contractors had been support roles in a domestic
sense for most of the course of American military history. The 1990s and
LOGCAP changed this relationship in a drastic manner. Forthcoming events
would alter the relationship even further.
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The Global War on Terrorism and PMCs
When 19 individuals associated with Al-Qaeda hijacked four American
planes on the morning of September 11 1h, 2001, the world was forever changed.
President George W. Bush declared a Global War on Terrorism in the following
months, and plans were drawn up to attack terrorists in the Middle East, Africa,
and any other location that harbored anti-American Islamic Fundamentalism.
Following the decade of growth under LOGCAP and the changing global
dynamics, PMCs were eager and available to lend a hand. Journalist Jeremy
Scahill even makes the argument that the "attacks almost instantly accelerated an
agenda of privatization" and that those in power oversaw the "explosion of a $100
billion global for-profit military industry" (Scahill 2007, p. l 05).
Starting in September 200 I, large contracts were beginning to be awarded.
For example, Blackwater was awarded a $35.7 million dollar contract for military
training for the Navy, a $610,000 dollar contract for consulting and training work
with the FBI, and a number of other considerable contracts with numerous federal
agencies and bureaus (Scahill 2007, p. l 05-106). KBR, a long standing contracting
partner for the US Army was also employed, along with 58 other organizations
(Kidwell 2005, p.30) As alluded to earlier, most of these contracts were for
training purposes only, but once the American armed forces started operations,
this role would change significantly.
In October 200 I, America and allies began bombing operations in
Afghanistan under the directive of Operation Enduring Freedom. By May of 2002,
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contractors were hitting the ground in Afghanistan in considerable numbers.
Blackwater was awarded a contract for 20 men to protect a clandestine CIA
facility in Afghanistan, with expressed orders to kill anyone who posed a threat or
that they deemed a threat (Pelton 2006, p. 37-38). While on paper these
Blackwater contractors were nothing more than the contractors of the past,
providing logistical support, in practice they were an entirely different animal.
Former Blackwater executive Jamie Smith described the operation as essentially
being the "CIA's paramilitary wing" (Pelton 2006, p. 38). For the first time in
American history, contractors were given the go-ahead to use force, and as a
result, the line between contractors and the military was blurred, if not entirely
removed.
Contractors continued to provide essential support, training, and security
roles throughout the early years of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
For example, contractors from the Dyncorp Corporation were given a contract to
protect Afghan President Hamid Karzai in early 2003, while KBR and others
constructed and staffed the number of American, and in some cases NATO, bases
in country in Afghanistan (Kidwell 2005, p.29-31 ). In the same way that
LOGCAP was an indicator of things to come, the new security role that some
PMCs were given in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom were
indicative of an alarming trend to come.
By early 2003, American policy makers, including President George W.
Bush were looking forward to the next course of the Global War on Terror. On
March 20, 2003, American forces invaded Iraq with the expressed purpose of
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toppling Saddam Hussein's Baath Party regime and establishing a constitutional
democracy in its place. As is true of all preceding wars in American history,
American forces were accompanied by private contractors. However, the
contractors that accompanied Operation Iraqi Freedom were a new breed of
contractors, ones that were numerous, fearless, and given the ability to use force.
As mentioned earlier, one of the contractors that the Bush Administration
had employed early on was Blackwater. Blackwater, a firm that started off
training police officers to respond to school shootings, was an ideological entity
that sought to support the US mission in any way possible (Scahill 2007, p.106107). Blackwater's founder, Erik Prince, argued that Blackwater's goal was to do
for "the national security apparatus what FedEx did for the Post Office"
(TheWeek 2014). In reality, what Blackwater, and other contractors, did was
completely reinvent the relationship between contractors and the American
military through their actions during the Iraq War and subsequent occupation.
In the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it looked like business as
usual however. ABT Associates was awarded a contract for medical training and
supplies for the Iraqi Health Ministry, and DynCorp received a contract to provide
supplies and training for the Iraqi Police (Kidwell 2005, p. 31-32). However, at
this time other, more nefarious, contracts were being awarded. For example,
Erinys International was given a contract to protect Iraqi oil pipelines, while
CusterBattles was granted a contract to protect the Iraqi airport from both
domestic and incoming threats and risks (Kidwell 2005, p.31 ). These latter jobs
granted contractors wide latitude when it came to the use of force, as these
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contractors were assuming roles that had traditionally fallen on military entities.
This intermingling of private actors participating in traditional military roles
would continue to define and haunt the Iraq War and occupation.
By June 2003, the Invasion oflraq was over, Saddam had been toppled,
and it appeared US Coalition forces, including its contractor partners that
numbered in the thousands, were victorious. However, only half of the war had
been won. Next came the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq in order to mold
the Iraq that the White House had envisioned. The man tasked with overseeing the
reconstruction of Iraq was one L. Paul Bremer III. Bremer, a longtime Republican
aide with ties to the White House, began his work by firing thousands of Iraqi
civil servants and dissolving the Iraqi military in an effort to "de-Baathify" the
Iraqi populace. Many argued that this would only serve to anger the population as
one analyst put it "if you starve a man, he's ready to shoot the occupier" (Scahill
2007, p.129). Unfortunately, Bremer's action led to distrust towards the
Provisional government which only served to fuel and support the already present
guerilla resistance. In response to the growing threat, Bremer required security.
The White House hired Blackwater on a sole source bid to protect their lead man
in the reconstruction of Iraq.
For the first time in American history, private contractors were solely
responsible for the well-being and survival of a top American diplomat and
administrator. Blackwater's contract with the US Government called for "personal
security detail and two helicopters" for Bremer, which included a heavily armed
and armored convoy (Scahill 2007, p.133). In his own words, Blackwater founder
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Erik Prince argues that "Blackwater' s men helped protect the ambassador from
ambush attempts on the roads, rocket attacks in the Green Zone, and increasingly
hostile Iraqis in general" (Prince 2013, p.77) In the same way that the Secret
Service protects the President during his travels, Blackwater protected Paul
Bremer. Overall, by most accounts, Blackwater was successful in its mission.
Despite their success though, this example further illustrates how much military
contractors had changed over the course of American history, and how prevalent
they had become as a foreign policy tool. Private military contractors were now
frontline actors who were responsible for protecting high ranking civilian leaders
and were given leeway in their use of force. Unfortunately, significant events
would test the limits of the relationship, and present considerable questions for
American policy makers.
Blackwater in Fallujah and Nisour Square
After roughly of year of Bremer's presence in Iraq, the situation all
throughout the country was tumultuous to say the least. Baghdad was infested
with looting and pillaging, and the countryside was fraught with extremists and
militia groups. The situation was similar in Fallujah. While the citizens of
Fallujah had established a patchwork administrative body that respected the
occupation, while also flexing some authority over daily Iraqi life, insurgents still
threatened the safety of the occupying forces (Scahill 2007, p.155-156).
Following several high visibility attacks from Saddam loyalists and other
insurgents, the First Marine Expeditionary Force took control of the city with the
expressed goal of cleansing the city of insurgents and engaged in a number of
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conflicts and skirmishes throughout Fallujah (Scahill 2007, p.157-164). It was
into this maelstrom that Blackwater and the whole private military contractor
industry was entering, and the results would be disastrous.
On March 31 5\ 2004, four Blackwater contractors, tasked with
transporting supplies across Fallujah were murdered by insurgents, and their
bodies hanged and defiled for the cameras and the world (Hills 2006; Scahill 2007,
p.164-168). While contractors had served a variety of roles throughout American
history, this marked a turning point for contractor-military relations. As journalist
Jeremy Scahill wrote, "it was the Mogadishu moment of the Iraq War," the only
difference being that these men were not military forces, but contractors
employed by the United States Government. For the first time, Americans were
made aware of the extent of private military contractors fighting their wars when
they saw the charred and mutilated bodies in March 2004. As Erik Prince wrote
"people who previously hadn't known a thing about PMCs now had but one
horrible scene-and one name-to associate with the industry" (Prince 2013,
p.122). Another issue was made apparent in the media coverage of the war. In the
US, many outlets referred to those that were killed as "civilians," which is
technically and legally correct, however, Iraqi sources and others found
contention with the fact that these "civilians" were highly armed and had engaged
in raids and assaults (Uesseler 2008, p.160). The presence of contractors was
made apparent to the world for the first time. Unfortunately, the turmoil
surrounding Blackwater, and by extension all contractors, would again swirl in
magnificent fashion only a few years later.
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Throughout 2007, Blackwater convoys and contractors were under attack
on regular occasion. For example, militants had shot down a Blackwater
helicopter, ambushed several convoys, and laid improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) in the path of their vehicles (Prince 2013, p.208). On September 16th, 2007,
a Blackwater convoy entered a heavily congested part of Baghdad known as
Nisour Square. What happened next varies from source to source however.
According to journalists and the Iraqi witnesses, Blackwater opened fire in
response to a nearby car bomb and confusion, but used "excessive force" that
ended the lives of9 Iraqi civilians (Scahill 2007, p.2-9; The Washington Post
2007). In contrast, Erik Prince argues that the scenario did not represent a crime
as the men were well trained and vetted, and that they only began firing out of
necessity due to time constraints and the pressure of the moment (Prince 2013, p.
211). Despite Prince's objections, the four Blackwater contractors were found
guilty on October 22nd, 2014 of killing the Iraqi civilians (The New York Times
2014). Also in response to these attacks, the US Congress investigated Blackwater
and its founders in 2007 for charges of excessive force and abuse of contracting
practices. Private contracting had gone from a logistical support, to a political and
military hazard.

Conclusion
When combat operations ended in Iraq and Afghanistan, the world had
witnessed the largest mercenary army in history support the most powerful
military in the world. In 2003, the contractor count had reached 20,000 personnel,
while Scahill claims that the US occupation utilized the largest concentration of
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contractors since World War 2 (Kidwell 2005, p.29; Scahill 2007). Additionally,
Wise (2012, p.2) shows that by early 2008, there were 190,000 contractors in Iraq,
compared to 200,000 military personnel, a ratio of almost 1 to 1. As written in the
introduction, my effort was to illustrate the prevalence, and changing nature, of
PMCs in American military history. A consideration of the numbers, in
combination with the variety of historical examples, serves that end.
It is without question that the tragedy at Fallujah, and the shootings at
Nisour Square greatly impacted the relationship between contractors and the US
government. However, it is worth noting that throughout the US invasion and
occupation of Iraq that other contractors including KBR, Dyncorp, and Triple
Canopy provided the traditional logistic role that had defined the role of
contractors throughout US military history. However, the importance of the
Blackwater case is that it illustrates the extreme end of contracting that has
resulted from their prevalence in US policy, particularly in the post-Cold War
world. Contractors have longed served an important and vital role supporting
American military missions by assuming non-combat roles to ease the burden on
the US military. From the support roles of early wars to the frontline security
roles of Iraq and Afghanistan, PMCs have been instrumental in American foreign
and domestic policy. While the role has changed, one should also consider how
the actor themselves have changed. For example, the literature shows that
mercenaries and PMCs are different entities that serve nearly identical functions,
that is PMCs are mercenaries in a sense, while also being an entirely new actor.
The analysis also provides evidence to this end. Instead of being a haphazard
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collection of non-military men arranged by individual commanders for varying
reasons, the modem PMC is a conglomerate of massive size that is coordinated
and functions like a business through its reliance on government contracts.
Additionally, the historical analysis chapter addresses other concerns
regarding PMCs, namely the moral concerns. As we have seen in the case of
Blackwater, PMCs can and have posed serious normative and moral challenges to
the American government. If unchecked, the privatization of force can breed
corruption and abuse. However, what this chapter most clearly illustrates is that
private actors have had an important role in the way the country wages war, and
that this relationship is unlikely to end any time soon.
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Chapter Three: Economic Analysis of PMCs
This analysis focuses entirely on the economic trends and realities related
to private military contractors and American foreign and domestic policy. This
chapter will be consist of two separate sections that both inform and work off of
each other, while also demonstrating individuals facets of the economic impact of
the privatization of military force through PMCs. The first section will focus on
the arguments for and against PMCs from an economic perspective, focused on
the theory of economic privatization that has been touched on earlier. The second
section will be a quantitative consideration of how contract spending from the
Department of Defense and the Department of State has changed over time, and
how this informs what we already, and will, know about the prevalence and
impact of PMCs.

Privatization and PMCs
As previously mentioned, the thrust of the first section of this chapter will
be to consider the economic arguments in favor of, and that led to, PMCs being a
prevalent actor in American foreign and domestic policy. As mentioned
throughout this text, the end of the Cold War brought about the climate and
environment that would give rise to the modem PMC. However, a more thorough
consideration of this era, particularly regarding the economic climate of this time,
would be beneficial to this analysis. Singer (2005, p.49-50) argues that two
nuanced factors that resulted from the end of the Cold War personify the change
in environment circum~tances and predicated the evolution of PMCs: change in
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the nature of warfare and the "privatization revolution." In regards to the change
in the nature of warfare, Singer (2005, p.49-50) argues that warfare became more
varied, globalized, and dangerous which were exacerbated by the demobilization
of forces in the West and the Soviet Union. These factors combined to present
challenges on both sides of warfare, at a time when the largest and most powerful
armies were either shrinking or directing their attention elsewhere. However, the
changing nature of warfare is only half of the equation.
Singer (2005) makes a two part argument regarding the post-Cold War
climate. While I have demonstrated the changing nature of warfare, a
consideration of privatization is still in order. To address this assertion, one
requires an answer to the question: what exactly is the "privatization revolution?"
Singer (2005, p.66-68) argues that Reagan and Thatcher's reintroduction of
conservatism to the West and successes of privatization of governmental activity
in America and Latin America, coupled with the failure of the centralized
command economies of the former Soviet Union brought privatization to the
attention of policy makers. Following the global realignment of the end of the
Cold War, many countries viewed privatization as a way of revitalizing
economies and entrenching democracy, thus the proliferation of privatization in
the post-Cold War world and the "privatization revolution." Overall, the
revolution in privatization was a global response to the centralized command
economies of the Soviet bloc and the stalled Keynesian economies of parts of the
Western World, and gave rise to the economy and environment in which military
contractors could thrive.
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While Singer and others make convincing political arguments regarding
the rise of privatization, I feel a brief consideration of the economic arguments
related to privatization are in order as well. In the most general sense, many
economists find that privatization does indeed reduce costs for governments at all
levels by reducing waste, inefficiencies, and by lowering labor costs (Afriff,
Cabanda, and Sathye 2009; Lundvist 1988; Megginson 2000). Additionally, other
economists have found that privatization in recent years has become doubly
effective because of the breakdown of the state monopoly on the use of force, and
the integration of privatization into traditionally state-centric enterprises (Apgar
IV and Keane 2004). As illustrated here, privatization in the abstract sense can
lead to greater savings in government according to economists, but there still
exists a debate over whether or not the employment of PMCs offers much savings
at all.
In their book The Three Trillion Dollar War, Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008)
attempt to calculate the true cost of the Iraq War. The central argument of their
piece is that the Iraq feature considerable instances of waste and fraud, and that
one of the main factors driving the bloated cost and financial liabilities in the war
was the use of private contractors (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008). Additionally, a 2008
Congressional Research Service Report found that ''the total direct cost to the U.S.
Government for acquiring security services in Iraq is not known" but that some
CBO estimates place the number near $4 billion dollars since 2003 (Elsea 2008,
p.4). During a House Oversight and Government Reform Hearing, Chairman
Remy Waxman articulate that $4 billion had been sent to contractors for the
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reconstruction phase alone, but that this number does not include funding for
other contractor services such as training or security services (Elsea 2008, p.4).
In addition to these raw numbers, some scholars believe that contractors
imposed costs in other ways. For example, Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) are critical
of contractor presence forcing the United States military to pay higher bonuses to
attract talent away from contractors. Other concerns raised include instances of
fraud and waste, including payment for work that was never completed, sole
source and cost-plus contracts, and just overall incompetence and corruption
(Kopecki 2006; Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008). While these scholars certainly make
intriguing and compelling arguments regarding the ill-advised financial decision
to use PMCs, others contend that privatization, even when done in the form of
PMCs, does indeed provide considerable savings for governmental entities.
In his piece "Outsourcing Wars," Wise (2012) contends that despite
considerable investments in PMCs during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars that the
use of contractors actually provides considerable savings for the United States
government. For example, in regards to death benefits Wise (2012, p.46)
highlights that while families of contractors that are killed in the field receive
death benefits, these benefits are capped, unlike military benefits, which can have
a very pronounced and noticeable impact on long term federal spending
projections. Thus, since all PMCs are considered the same entity under US law,
those that provide security such as Blackwater are presented with similar benefits
to a cook, while engaging in much more dangerous work. Similar caps exist in
regards to injury as well. If a contractor is injured in the exact same manner as a
50

traditional soldier is, both actors would receive benefits until healed, but the
presence of a cap would lead to contractors receiving less benefits overall than a
military member (Wise 2012, p. 56).
The impact of the caps and other regulations on contractors is not readily
apparent until one considers the numbers behind the disparity. I will use the
example of an Anny Corporal and contractor that both suffer a severe leg injury
using numbers provide by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) and Wise (2012). The
contractor would receive 66.67% percent of their weekly pay for the duration of
the injury, while the Army Corporal would receive 75% of his or her monthly pay.
However, these benefits would continue for the remainder of the Anny Corporal's
life, while the contractor would only receive temporary benefits (Wise 2012).
Overall, while the contractor would receive a larger sum in the short term, the
Anny Corporal would receive moderate benefits but for a longer expanse of time.
Assuming the contractor made $1000 a week and the Anny Corporal made $565 a
week, the contractor would receive $162,748 for one year, while the Army
Corporal would receive $70,344.56 a year for the rest of his life. (Stiglitz and
Bilmes 2008, Wise 2012) As you can see, the long term cost commitments are
considerably smaller for contractors than for traditional military actors.
Overall, Wise (2012) points out that when considering long term spending
in regards to health insurance and injury and death benefits, the cases of Iraq and
Afghanistan indicate that it is actually cheaper to utilize PMCs in dangerous role
as their death and injury benefits are subjected to limitations that can amount to
considerable savings for the federal government. However, relying too heavily on
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contractors could have an inverse effect in the future if those who are contracted
to fight believe that the limited benefits are insufficient compensation for the level
of work they are engaged in.
As illustrated here, there are compelling cases to be made on both sides of
the PMC debate. While it is hard to dismiss the argument that the financial
commitments to PMCs in the short term are substantial, the long term impacts of
PMCs provide greater understanding of their value in regards to using force.
However, both sides of the debate illustrate the central thrust of this chapter:
PMCs account for a considerable share of Defense and State department spending
despite their relative obscurity.

Considering the Numbers behind the Explosion in Contracting
The first section of this chapter dealt with the debates surrounding the
economic value of using contractors as a tool of foreign and domestic policy.
However, that only accounts for half of the picture. I believe a consideration of
how substantial PMCs are in a quantitative sense provides additional support for
establishing the prevalence of PMCs as a political actor.
As established throughout this piece, the explosion of PMCs on the global
arena occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Also demonstrated
throughout this piece is that the United States embraced PMCs wholeheartedly
during the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of these two truths, I will be
considering only modem data from 2000 onward. Using USASpending.Gov
(2014), I chart the growth in contractors from bi-annually from 2000 to 2010 and
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comment on the findings and trends following the associated graphs. The search
parameters will include only contracts and not grants, loans, or other associated
terms. I chose to only search contracts as the literature shows that PMCs are most
often tendered contracts instead of other federal funding types. I chose to only use
the Department of Defense and the Department of State as cases because these
departments are usually those that employ PMCs for security and construction
purposes. The findings for the Department of Defense are presented in Graph 1
and the findings for the Department of State are found in Graph 2:
Graph 1: Department of Defense Bi-Annual Contract Spending, 2000-2010
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Graph 2: Department of State Bi-Annual Contract Spending, 2000-2010
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As you can see from the graphs, the general spending trends that were
predicted in the literature review and throughout this paper are indeed supported
by the numbers. Overall, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan featured significant
contract investments from the Departments of Defense and State. For example,
from 2000 to 2008, contractor spending increased considerably for both
Departments, from $150 billion to nearly $400 billion for the Defense Department
and from $1.5 billion to nearly $8 billion for the State Department. Overall, while
the salience of PMCs to the average voter is very low, this small portion of data
illustrates that it should be much higher. PMCs accounted for over half of the
budget for the Department of Defense from 2004 to 2010. This demonstrates the
presence of significant public investment into a portion of the economy that not

54

many know, or seem to care, about and helps to support the overarching argument
that PMCs are a prevalent actor in American foreign and domestic policy. To
conclude, while at face value this analysis appears limited in scope, the chart
presents a very simple truth: the United States government in recent years has
relied heavily on PMCs, and the budget allocations prove this.
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Chapter Four: Legal Analysis of PMCs
The final analysis will focus on the legal presence of PMCs. Throughout
American history, we have relied on the various court systems throughout the
country to protect our constitutional rights and to enact justice when necessary.
Court rulings can greatly impact the political and social climate, and can set the
legal and statutory precedent for issues ranging from gun rights to reproductive
and civil rights. Through the basic act of ruling on issues or actors, courts have an
instant legitimizing or delegitimizing impact on whatever the subject is.
Additionally, when legislation is passed, and upheld, it provides a legitimizing
effect on issues. From this logic, I will again prove the long standing and
prevalent nature of PMCs through their presence in the American legal system.
The first major legal precedent established regarding PMCs was in 1941.
In 1941, Congress passed the Defense Base Act. This act requires companies that
receive federal contracts and have personnel who perform contractual duties
outside of the United States to obtain worker's compensation insurance in case of
injury or death (Wise 2012, p. 35). As mentioned earlier, World War 2 was the
setting for a considerable contractor presence, and in response to this, the United
States Congress acted. While not substantial by any measure, the Defense Base
Act presents the one of the first indications of the legal entrenchment of PMCs.
While not civilian law, the introduction of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) had immeasurable impact on how PMCs were treated under the
law for much of the 20th century. In 1950, when the UCMJ was enacted, it ruled
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that "those serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field" were
subject to the exact same rules and specifications as traditional armed forces
(Lindemann 2007, p.86). That is to say that contractors were on equal footing
with traditional armed forces when it came to being under the purview of military
law. For example, under the UCMJ, contractors could be court martialed for any
violation or atrocity as a traditional soldier. However, changes in the UCMJ from
civilian courts would greatly impact the relationship between the UCMJ and
contractors.
In 1957, the Supreme Court ruled that the military could not court martial
civilian contractors in the same way as military forces as the Court ruled that that
applying military law to civilians in this instance was unconstitutional
(Lindemann 2007, p.86). This ruling created a gap in the legal lexicon which
granted contractors greater freedom in war zones in regards to their behavior
when compared to other armed forces. It was not only civilian courts that began to
carve out niches for contractors though. In 1970, a contractor convicted of a war
crime was acquitted by a military court because their interpretation of war was
different than the one presented in the UCMJ (Lindemann 2007, p.86). The
UCMJ definition of "war" rested on the actual act of declaring war from Congress,
and not the unilateral action that was Vietnam (Lindemann 2007, p.86). Despite
initially strong regulations on PMCs and their actions, courts both military and
civilian carved out a legal void where PMCs were able to act unilaterally in most
instances with little legal regulation or ramification.
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This near-immunity status of contractors would only be reinforced in 1987.
In their ruling on Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation, the Supreme Court
established the legal precedent known to legal scholars as the "government
contractor defense" (Christensen and Battista 2009, p.12). This ruling created a
legal grounds for defense in response to product liability concerns and lawsuits.
According to Christensen and Battista (2009, p.13) the "government contractor
defense existed under federal common law" and in effect "barred the plaintiffs
state law design defect claim." In other words, it is almost impossible to sue to
find liable contractors that supply goods for the military for wrong doing if their
provided goods should injure or kill someone, as was the case with this hearing.
Again, a civilian court ruled in favor of PMCs and established a legal precedent to
protect them from lawsuits for wrongdoing. Not only could PMCs no longer be
tried as a military entity, the Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation ruling
created a precedent for defense from liability lawsuits.
Following these rulings, contractors were basically self-regulating entities.
The military and civilian courts had few, if any, ways to rein in the actions of
PMCs. However, in 2000, Congress attempted to provide some level of regulation
to PMCs through the passage of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
(MEJA). MEJA made it possible for contractors employed under the Department
of Defense to be brought back to American to be tried for "any crime that would
be a felony under US law" (Lindemann 2007, p.86). On paper, MEJA represented
the first serious effort to rein in contractors since the UCMJ. However,
Lindemann (2007, p.86) argues that MEJA has had "little visible effect" on the
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behavior of PMCs and how they are tried by the United States legal system.
Unfortunately, much like the UCMJ, legal interpretation and language has greatly
impacted the potential impact of the bill. For instance, the MEJA protects only
contractors employed by the Department of Defense, not those employed by other
branches of the federal government. This provides a large exemption because the
State Department and the Department of the Interior employ contractors that
behave similar to those in the Department of Defense, yet the MEJA does not
apply to these contractors.
Unfortunately, the shortcomings of MEJA would be highlighted in the

Saleh v. Titan Corp ruling. In 2009, Iraqi citizen Haidar Muhsin Saleh brought a
state law-based tort action against Titan Corporation over the treatment he
received while at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Mr. Saleh claimed that both
American soldiers and PMC forces physically injured and berated him, including
such vile acts as forced sodomy, electric shock, and beatings and dragging. When
Saleh's case was heard in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the
court created a rule where PMCs were immune from state tort liability only when
the "contractor's employees were acting under the direct command and exclusive
operation control of the military" (Perry 2013, p.608). However, when an appeal
was heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the
court ruled that PMCs could not be sued for a state law tort "where the PMC is
integrated into military combatant activities during wartime" (Perry 2013, p.608).
Instead of providing some protections for those abused by PMCs, the Saleh V.
Titan ruling ended up protecting PMCs even further. Unfortunately, the apparent
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legal trend regarding PMCs is one of immense protection and varying levels of
legal immunity.
As illustrated here, the legal legacy of PMCs is long and varied. While
attempts have been made to rein in PMCs and their abuses, the legal system
seems to side with PMCs most of the time. Despite some instances to the
contrary, the previously mentioned recent conviction of those Blackwater
contractors present at Nisour Square for example, PMCs appear to pose a
legitimate legal dilemma for American policy makers. However, the purpose of
this chapter was not to form a legal opinion of PMCs. Instead, this chapter was to
illuminate even further the prevalence of PMCs in American foreign and domestic
policy. While the legal focus is brief and focused, the purpose is not affected. In
the end, the legal considerations surrounding PMCs presents even more evidence
of their prevalence in American life.
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Chapter Five: Conclusions
The end of the Cold War brought about monumental changes in the global
political climate. One of those changes is the marked rise in the use of private
military contractors to enact political and military ends. While scholars accept that
PMCs are a modem phenomena, the American public appears to be neglectful of
this truth, and maybe even of their existence at all. Additionally, scholars have
looked at PMCs in a broad sense while neglecting focused case studies It is this
gap that this research hopes to plug. Following a brief consideration of PMCs and
a number of factors surrounding them, I established that PMCs were not a salient
issue to the American electorate according to the framework established by
Epstein and Segal (2000). I then demonstrated that while the American electorate
pays little attention to PMCs, they are pervasive, prevalent, and an important
phenomena in American foreign and domestic policy. Through a consideration of
their political, historical, and military contributions, I was able to illustrate that
PMCs have existed in some capacity even back to the days of the Revolutionary
War, while also demonstrating that modem PMCs are unique in and of
themselves, and that they are shaping American foreign and domestic policy in
many impactful ways.
The historical consideration played a number of roles in the analysis. First,
the analysis effectively illustrated the long-standing nature of private actors in
American military endeavors. This qualitative consideration provided the most
essential and telling evidence of PMC infiltration in American foreign and
domestic policy. By considering how military actors interacted with, and relied on,
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these actors, their prevalence was established and also illustrated the closeness of
this historical bond. Secondly, while establishing their sheer presence was vital,
the historical analysis also addressed the number of factors that contributed to
marked growth and change in the realm of private military contractors. From the
early patchwork systems of the Revolutionary War to the corporate bodies of the
PMCs in Iraq, the historical section supported the literature while also providing
other insights into PMC behavior. Overall, the historical section provided an indepth demonstration of the depth and breadth of the relationship between
American military actors and private actors.
However, the political and military consideration was only part of the
picture. I then relied on narrow, but focused, examinations of the economic and
legal legacy of PMCs as a way of further illustrating my point. Overall, the
considerable contract investments of the past decade, combined with the legal
legacy left by congressional acts and court rulings, filled in even more of the
picture. The ramifications of the economic analysis deserve some special attention.
As illustrated by the graphs, the contractual obligations to PMCs rose
dramatically in the early to mid-2000s, a point in line with the literature on the
topic. What the economic analysis illustrated above all is that PMCs are not some
abstract actors working near the fringes, but are entities that consume
considerable portions of the Department of Defense budget. This presents reasons
for salience, while providing comparative concerns regarding the low salience.
The legal analysis shows that not only do PMCs exist in the military realm,
but that they are also phenomena that have required government and judicial
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regulation and rulings. One truth of American public discourse is that the
discussion is often shaped by how Congress and the Supreme Court rules or
interprets certain issues, and in the case of PMCs, this is no different. The legal
analysis had a legitimizing impact on PMCs. One of the true values of the legal
analysis is that it demonstrated that PMCs do not exist in the fringes of black ops,
but are an issue that have been judged by the major political institutions of the
country. One facet unexplored in this piece is the impact Supreme Court rulings
and pieces of legislation have on salience, and perhaps an analysis of these factors
in regards to PMC-centered rulings and legislation would be fruitful.
Yet I must also acknowledge that there are some limitations regarding
pieces of this work. To begin, the approach utilized to measure salience has some
shortcomings. While I utilized only one specific publication, perhaps greater
insight would be provided by a greater examination of salience through the
inclusion of additional newspapers. Additionally, one could focus the search
beyond simply headlines, and perhaps cull different results. Continuing, there
deserves some elaboration on the Defense and State Department data. While I
narrowed the search parameters on USASpending.Gov to only include contracts,
there is the very real possibility that the numbers are inflated. While PMCs are
funded through contracts, other non-PMC entities, particularly in the State
Department, are also funded through contracts, and as a result this could inflate
the numbers. However, I anticipate that this does not impact the level to which we
invest in PMCs, but instead only provides some limitations on the accuracy of the
given data. Additionally, little time is spent considering American political culture
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and civil-military relations and the vast body of literature in those fields and the
'
influence these fields could have on our understanding of PMCs. Overall, while
these limitations exist, I do not believe that they directly contradict or severely
impact the results of the analyses, but instead provide potential for future research.

It is also important to discuss how valid the research and findings are
internally and externally. For starters, it is apparent that the evidence does indicate
that PMCs are a long-standing and prevalent force in American history, thus
leading to internal validity. While I do not seek to undermine this truth, external
validity should be considered as well. I see no reason why this research could not
be replicated for other Western countries such as Great Britain, Australia, and
Germany. One factor that the literature focused on was that PMCs are usually
employed by wealthier countries. These countries are wealthier, and have had
long military histories, much like the United States, and would provide
comparable baselines. However, even if one was not to do a comparative style
paper, I believe it would be easy to demonstrate the long standing nature of
private warriors in some capacity throughout history of any country or people.
The research and findings also have considerable implications for policy
and political theory. While it was touched on briefly, a consideration of PM Cs as
a solution to the collective action problem of national defense would be fruitful
and informative, and would help to inform our understanding of why PMCs are
employed even more. A more thorough investigation of the economic savings of
PMCs vs. traditional armed forces would help to settle the brewing debate over
the cost-savings of employing PMCs. Wise's (2012) piece only considered a
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narrow window of time, and perhaps an expansion of his research focus would
provide additional details or compelling caveats in the actual financial savings
associated with PMCs. Finally, while this research does indeed illuminate the
long entrenched nature of private warriors in American history, the findings also
present numerous opportunities for future research.
While scholars agree that the end of the Cold War brought about the rise
of PMCs, actors of their ilk appear to have a long vested interest in serving a war
time role. However, the findings illustrate that overall, Americans are unaware of
these actors and many of the costs and implications of their use. While we
certainly understand some facets of the current PMCs, one can only speculate on
how the next considerable global political event can change their prerogative and
objectives.
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